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Abstract
We survey the recent literature on the eﬀects of active labor market policies
on individual labor market outcomes like employment and income, for adult
female individuals without work in European countries. We consider skill-
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11 Introduction
During the past decades, female labor force participation has risen in most Eu-
ropean countries. Nevertheless, there are still substantial diﬀerences in partici-
pation across countries. Moreover, women are typically over-represented among
the unemployed. Because of this, active labor market polices are potentially very
important to bring women into employment, and to increase their income levels.
Such policies are not speciﬁcally designed for women, and many evaluation stud-
ies do not address the issue to what extent the eﬀects for women diﬀer from the
eﬀects for men.
In this paper we survey the existing literature on the eﬀects of active labor
market policies on female individual labor market outcomes like employment and
income. We consider training programs, monitoring and sanctions, job search
assistance, adult education, and employment subsidies. We focus on European
countries. High labor market frictions and labor market inﬂexibility have led
to relatively high average unemployment durations and loww age and income
inequality. Accordingly, we use a dynamic job search framework to interpret the
results.
Since a number of years, the EU itself has been concerned about female labor
market outcomes. In 1997 the EU laid down its so-called “European Employment
Strategy”. This set of policy objectives and guidelines is focused on increasing the
employability of individuals, and explicitly emphasizes the aim of obtaining equal
opportunity for women and men. Since 1999, gender mainstreaming has been put
into concrete terms in the Employment Guidelines of the EU (see M¨ uller and
Kurtz 2003). These guidelines emphasize the importance of the reconciliation of
work and family life and the return to employment after family-related career
breaks. They also contain the directive to document gender-speciﬁc eﬀects when
evaluating labor market policy programs.
To increase the focus of the survey, we restrict attention to adult women,
meaning women aged over 25. Younger individuals often face diﬀerent sets of
labor market policies, notably due to the so-called “comprehensive approach”
imposed by the EU. We also exclude active labor market policies for working
individuals.
In terms of the individual labor market outcomes, we take the pragmatic ap-
proach that we focus on the outcomes that have been deemed interesting (i.e.
evaluated) in the literature. Most studies examine the probability of employment
2or its determinants like the duration of unemployment or the transition rate from
unemployment to work. Only very few studies (also) examine annual income or
wages. Diﬀerent parameters or outcome measures are informative on diﬀerent
aspects of labor market behavior and policy eﬀectiveness. For example, to un-
derstand the behavioral eﬀect it is more interesting to knowthe eﬀect on the
transition rate from unemployment to work than to know the eﬀect on the mean
duration of unemployment, because the latter also depends on the moment of
treatment exposure and on the presence of other active labor market policies.
Moreover, unemployment can end in a transition to non-participation, which has
diﬀerent welfare implications than a transition into work. On the other hand,
eﬀects on the mean unemployment duration are important from a cost-beneﬁt
point of view, in particular for the institution paying unemployment beneﬁts.
Eﬀects on the mean duration are also amenable to incorporate the costs due to
the “lock-in” time spent in a program.
We mostly restrict attention to recent studies, meaning (i) studies published
since the period covered by the major survey in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith
(1999), and (ii) unpublished studies based on data from after that period. This
is not a major restriction as not many academic studies with European data
have been published before the late 1990s, and those who have generally do not
distinguish between gender eﬀects.
We only consider studies that use data at the individual level. These can be
survey data and/or register data. Apart from this, diﬀerent studies use diﬀer-
ent methodologies. Some use propensity score matching, others use panel data
methods, (conditional) diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, instrumental variables, social ex-
periments, or timing-of-event (duration analysis) methods. We are agnostic to
the methods used in the studies we survey. In general we put most emphasis
on studies published in the academic sphere, including academic working paper
series. Of course, diﬀerent methods are sometimes not mutually compatible, or
they provide information on diﬀerent parameters of interest (see e.g. Heckman
and Vytlacil, 2005, for a recent overview). We should also make the obvious point
that programs are sometimes diﬃcult to compare across countries and over time.
Moreover, the boundary between diﬀerent sets of programs is sometimes diﬃ-
cult to draw. Training programs sometimes include job search assistance, and
monitoring may entail enrollment into training.
Some important surveys of active labor market policy eﬀects have been pub-
lished in the academic literature. We already mentioned the the major survey in
3Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999). Surveys with a focus on Europe include
Kluve (2006). These surveys do not pay particular attention to eﬀects for women.
Fay (1996), Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), and Martin and Grubb (2001)
focus on OECD countries, but their conclusions regarding gender diﬀerences are
mostly driven by studies based on U.S. data.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss economic lines
of reasoning that can be used to understand the policy eﬀects at the individual
level. We also provide some aggregate statistics on women in the labor market.
Section 3 surveys the results. Section 4 concludes and outlines some avenues for
future research.
2 The labor market context
There is a large literature on the estimation of the eﬀects of changes in the
hourly wage on labor supply outcomes, notably participation and number of hours
worked. Such analyses are closely linked to neo-classical labor market theory.
In the context of continental-European labor market conditions, the results can
be interpreted as capturing long-run eﬀects, whereas short-run and medium-run
eﬀects are more aﬀected by labor market frictions and involuntary unemployment
(see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Nevertheless, this literature has drawn some
conclusions that may be relevant for our purposes. Most importantly, female labor
supply is much more responsive to wage changes than male labor supply. This
applies to the hours decision for participants but even more so to the participation
decision (see e.g. the overviewin Killingsw orth and Heckman, 1986, and the more
recent meta-study by Evers, De Mooij and Van Vuuren, 2006). Secondly, the
responsiveness of female labor supply seems to have decreased during the past
decades, along with an increase in female labor force participation.
The result that female labor supply is more responsive has been explained
by reference to the so-called Le Chatelier principle which basically states that
individuals with more options have more elastic supply functions. Suppose that
women have more alternatives to devote their time to (notably, in addition to
work and leisure, also home work including child care) than men. If the wage
rate increases then women substitute time away from both leisure and home
work, resulting in a larger labor supply response than for men. Along these lines
one can also explain the lower level of labor force participation among women.
4Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) provide a formal analysis and discussion.
This line of reasoning can also be relevant in the context of active labor market
programs for unemployed women in a labor market with search frictions. The
dynamic decision problem faced by an unemployed woman takes into account
that there is an outside option of choosing to bear children and/or become a
housewife, while a partner may provide household income. These factors may
increase the attractiveness of not working vis-` a-vis working. Not willing to work
does not necessarily mean that the individual is not registered as unemployed.
One may be registered but set a reservation wage higher than the going wage,
or have a zero search intensity. Participation in a program that increases labor
market opportunities, like a successful skill-enhancing training program, may
subsequently lead to job oﬀers that are acceptable and/or to a positive optimal
job search intensity. In the long run this would lead to employment. In such cases,
one may expect average program eﬀects to be larger for women than for men. Of
course, if the program is completely ineﬀective then the eﬀects should be zero for
both genders.
If the female labor force participation is lowthen these issues may be more
relevant. First of all, a lowparticipation goes along w ith a high sensitivity of
female labor supply with respect to the wage. Secondly, the more qualiﬁed and
potentially productive the adult female population is, the closer actual labor
market conditions will be to the conditions that induce an eventual transition
into work for many women. In Europe, historically, the average education level of
non-participating women in economies with low female labor force participation
was not particularly low, so that the potential for their productive participation
was relatively high.
A high female labor force participation goes along with lower sensitivity of fe-
male labor supply. Moreover, in such a situation, women who are non-participant
or long-term unemployed may have on average lower skills than those in the situ-
ation of the previous paragraph. Therefore one would expect lower policy eﬀects
than in that situation.
A diﬀerent reason for why active labor market policies could work better
for women than for men builds on the assumption that many women have a
greater distance to the labor market. Because of this they may under-estimate
their opportunities, and they may be unaware of the non-pecuniary utility of
being employed. Program participation may then help to increase the eagerness
to become employed. This explanation may also be more relevant in economies
5with a relatively low female labor force participation.
Similarly, with a high distance, employers may statistically discriminate against
women. Active labor market policies may then provide an opportunity for em-
ployers to learn the individual productivity of a woman. This may be particularly
relevant for employment subsidies.
Monitoring (i.e., controlling whether unemployed individuals comply with
rules on job search eﬀort and behavior) is diﬀerent from the other policies in
that it necessarily reduces the individual’s expected present value (see e.g. Van
den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006). An increase in monitoring is supposed
to increase the transition rate to work. However, in that case, the average wage
of the jobs will be lower. The line of reasoning earlier in this subsection leads
one to suspect that for women it may also be attractive to respond to increased
monitoring by way of leaving the labor force.
In Table 1 and 2 we provide descriptive statistics on the labor force participa-
tion rates for men and women in diﬀerent countries and years. We also distinguish
between participation in numbers of individuals on the one hand, and participa-
tion in terms of part-time versus full-time jobs on the other. In the sequel, we say
that an economy has lowfemale labor force participation if the gender partici-
pation gap exceeds 10 percentage points in absolute value in the year in Table 2
closest to the years in which we observe the economy under consideration.
3 Policy eﬀects
3.1 Skill training
Here, we summarize the results of 15 studies that distinguish between training
eﬀects for women and men.1 The range of training courses that are evaluated is
broad, but typically the courses take place in classrooms and contain some on-the-
job training aspects. Also, the program participation duration typically ranges
from 0.5 to 1 year, although there are programs as short as 1 month and as long as
1See Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005), Biewen et al. (2006), Bolvig, Jensen
and Rosholm (2003), Cavaco, Foug` ere and Pouget, (2005), Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002), Kluve,
Lehmann and Schmidt (1999), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimueller (2000), Lechner, Miquel and
Wunsch (2004), Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2008), Lubyova and Van Ours (1999), Raaum,
Torp and Zhang (2002a, 2002b), Richardson and Van den Berg (2006), Weber and Hofer (2004),
and Zhang (2003).
6Table 1: Selected labor market indicators for prime–aged women
Labor force Part–time Unemployment
participation rate share rate
1984 1994 2004 1984 1994 2004 1984 1994 2004
Austria 71.7 79.6 29.6 3.8 4.8
Belgium 56.4 67.2 74.3 24.1 30.0 34.1 15.7 11.2 7.4
Czech Republic 83.2 80.9 5.6 5.2 4.4 9.3
Denmark 82.7 82.7 84.9 36.7 26.2 24.3 9.0 9.0 5.1
Finland 85.8 84.0 84.6 11.5 14.9 3.6 12.5 7.6
France 68.2 76.7 80.3 21.4 24.5 23.6 8.7 13.1 10.0
Germany 58.0 72.6 82.0 25.8 28.0 37.0 7.2 10.1 9.0
Western Germany 68.0 79.0 43.0 53.0 7.0 9.0
Eastern Germany 94.0 92.0 18.0 35.0 21.0 20.0
Hungary 71.5 71.0 5.1 8.1 5.6
Ireland 32.1 53.6 67.9 17.6 25.5 35.1 8.2 13.4 3.1
Netherlands 43.4 64.5 76.7 54.5 60.2 9.0 7.8 3.6
Norway 74.2 79.4 82.8 37.7 33.2 2.5 3.8 3.3
Poland 78.6 76.4 17.5 14.5 18.0
Slovak Republic 81.1 84.0 4.4 4.5 11.6 17.5
Spain 34.1 54.6 68.3 14.3 17.2 14.0 28.6 13.8
Sweden 88.2 86.9 85.3 24.9 20.8 2.3 6.8 5.2
Switzerland 74.0 80.8 44.9 45.3 4.2 4.6
United Kingdom 66.8 74.1 76.8 41.2 41.2 40.4 9.7 6.4 3.4
Europe 57.2 66.0 69.6 26.9 27.0 28.2 8.9 10.9 9.2
Notes: Prime age covers ages 25–54. Part–time shares are over all ages. Labor force participation
rate and unemployment rate for Netherlands is not available for 2004; 2003 data are used
instead. Data for the two diﬀerent parts of Germany refer to individuals aged between 35 and
55 years and are taken from Datenreport Deutschland 2006; otherwise OECD Online Statistics
Database 2006.
7Table 2: Male–Female gap in selected labor market indicators for prime–aged
individuals
Labor force Part–time Unemployment
participation rate share rate
1984 1994 2004 1984 1994 2004 1984 1994 2004
Austria 20.8 13.3 -25.8 -0.8 -1.0
Belgium 37.7 24.9 16.8 -20.4 -25.5 -27.8 -9.6 -4.7 -1.4
Czech Republic 12.0 13.7 -3.6 -3.7 -1.8 -3.7
Denmark 10.3 9.2 6.4 -28.5 -16.5 -12.7 -1.8 -2.3 -0.7
Finland 7.6 6.2 5.4 -5.0 -7.0 0.4 3.0 -0.7
France 27.7 18.4 13.4 -17.4 -19.2 -18.8 -3.3 -3.5 -2.4
Germany 35.6 20.3 11.3 -24.0 -25.0 -30.7 -1.5 -3.6 0.8
Western Germany 28.0 18.0 -42.0 -49.0 -1.0 -1.0
Eastern Germany 3.0 5.0 -18.0 -30.0 -7.0 -2.0
Hungary 15.4 14.0 -2.9 2.2 -0.3
Ireland 63.6 37.7 23.8 -13.9 -19.1 -28.2 7.3 0.0 1.4
Netherlands 48.5 27.8 16.7 -43.2 -45.1 3.2 -2.6 -0.1
Norway 22.3 11.1 7.3 -30.0 -22.9 0.2 1.3 1.0
Poland 12.3 11.6 -10.0 -3.2 -2.0
Slovak Republic 13.8 9.7 -3.1 -3.2 -1.2 -2.9
Spain 60.5 38.5 24.2 -12.0 -14.6 0.0 -12.3 -6.9
Sweden 6.7 4.4 4.8 -17.7 -12.3 -0.1 2.6 0.4
Switzerland 23.4 14.9 -38.1 -37.2 -1.1 -1.1
United Kingdom 28.6 18.9 14.1 -37.1 -34.2 -30.4 -0.4 3.4 0.4
Europe 37.5 26.8 21.9 -23.4 -22.1 -22.1 -2.0 -2.7 -1.6
Notes: Prime age covers ages 25–54. Part–time shares are over all ages. The labor force par-
ticipation rate and unemployment rate for Netherlands are unavailable for 2004; 2003 data are
used instead. Data for the two diﬀerent parts of Germany refer to individuals aged between
35 and 55 years and are taken from Datenreport Deutschland 2006; otherwise OECD Online
Statistics Database 2006.
83 years. Short courses are supposed to upgrade existing skill knowledge, whereas
long courses are supposed to lead to the acquisition of skills for a completely new
occupation. Occasionally, courses take place in practice ﬁrms or in the context of
a regular job.
The majority of studies (13 out of 15) ﬁnd positive eﬀects of training on labor
market outcomes for women, for all types of training and/or averaged over all
training types considered, or (in 3 cases) for selected types of training. Most of
the studies focus on the employment probability or the transition rate to work as
the outcome of interest. In many cases the eﬀects on such employment outcomes
exceed the eﬀects for men, and often the latter are close to zero and insigniﬁcant.2
Studies reaching these conclusions evaluate training programs in e.g. Austria in
1999–2001, France in 1996–1997, Western Germany in 1993–1994 and 2000–2002,
Norway in 1990–2000, or Poland in 1992–1994. As a comparison with Table 1 and
Table 2 reveals, the female labor force participation was relatively low in these
areas at the time of the program. The gap in labor force participation for example
for France in 1994 was 18.6 percentage points. For Western Germany the gap in
2004 still reached 18 percentage points, declining from as high as 28 percentage
points in 1994. In countries like Poland and Norway the gap amounted to about
11 percentage points in 1994.
In contrast, Eastern Germany, Denmark and Sweden enjoy a relative high
female labor market participation. In these areas the gap between male and fe-
male labor force participation rate amounts to less than 10 percentage points in
absolute value (see Table 2). Evaluation studies for training programs in these
areas typically come to the conclusion that there are no gender speciﬁc eﬀects of
training.3
Thus, positive and larger eﬀects of training on employment outcomes for
women compared to men go along with a larger gender gap in labor force partici-
2E.g. Biewen et al. (2006), Cavaco, Foug` ere and Pouget (2005), Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt
(1999), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimueller (2000), Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2004), Weber
and Hofer (2004), and Zhang (2003).
3See for example Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005), Biewen et al. (2006),
Bolvig, Jensen, Rosholm (2003), and Richardson and Van den Berg (2006). Lechner, Miquel
and Wunsch (2004) ﬁnd that some programs work better for women and some programs work
better for men, but this does not necessarily violate our hypothesis, as they argue that diﬀerent
eﬀects are connected with the men and women following diﬀerent programs. Men were often
trained in construction work and construction workers suﬀer since the mid 1990s from an
extremely high unemployment rate.
9pation. This is in agreement to the economic line of reasoning in Section 2, which
emphasizes the importance of a shift away from home production in response to
a productivity increase due to training.4
It is not possible to address the question whether training programs raise the
earnings or wages of women and whether these eﬀects are larger than for men,
simply because too fewstudies investigate this issue by gender. 5,6
3.2 Job search assistance
Job search assistance typically encompasses a variety of activities aimed at im-
proving the speed of ﬁnding a suitable job. Notably, it includes an assessment of
the individual’s skills, counseling, teaching presentation and job search abilities,
as well as direct referral of unemployed to job openings. The activities can take
place in one-to-one meetings with case workers or in job clubs, or as classroom
training. The boundary between job search assistance and skill training programs
is somewhat ﬂuid, as job search assistance may also involve short training courses
to upgrade certain skills. For example, a course on howto use the internet to
search for jobs also enables the individual to use the internet in general.
In general, for each gender, evaluation studies ﬁnd favorable eﬀects of job
search assistance on the various employment outcome measures of interest, like
the exit rate to work, the job retention rate, the employment probability, and the
4Two studies deviate from this pattern. Switzerland has a low female labor force partic-
ipation, but Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002) ﬁnd no major diﬀerences between short run eﬀects
of training for men and women at the end of the 1990s. The employment probability eﬀects
are generally negligible or even negative. It should be mentioned that Lalive, Van Ours and
Zweim¨ uller (2000), who cover the same time period for Switzerland, ﬁnd that there are generally
positive eﬀects for women, and larger eﬀects than for men. The second exception is Lubyova
and Van Ours (1999) who estimate positive eﬀects of training for men and women in Slovakia,
but the eﬀects for men are larger than for women. However, a model speciﬁcation test casts
doubt on the validity of the speciﬁcation.
5Raaum, Torp and Zhang (2002a, 2002b), and Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2008).
6Adult education programs are similar to skill training programs in that they aim to enhance
productivity and employability. We do not cover their evaluation because, ﬁrst of all, adult
education is generally not regarded to be an active labor market policy, its participants often
being categorized as non-labor-force-participants, and secondly, there are almost no evaluation
studies by gender. Using recent Swedish data, Albrecht, Van den Berg and Vroman (2004)
ﬁnd a slightly stronger employment eﬀect for men, but the sample sizes are too small to put
signiﬁcance to this ﬁnding.
10probability of not receiving beneﬁts.7 All seven studies examine economies with
a relatively lowfemale labor force participation. Of these, 5 (w hereby one for a
subprogram) ﬁnd larger eﬀects for women than for men.8 However, some studies
ﬁnd similar eﬀects for men and women, or less positive eﬀects for women than
for men, even though they also concern economies with a low female labor force
participation.9 One of the studies also evaluates job search assistance programs in
a setting with relatively high female labor force participation.10 This study ﬁnds
no eﬀects on the employment probability for women but small positive eﬀects for
men.
3.3 Monitoring and sanctions
In European countries, monitoring the job search eﬀort of unemployed workers,
and punishing them ﬁnancially if they do not meet the eﬀort requirements, has
become increasingly common (see e.g. OECD, 2000, for a survey). The monitoring
may be purely administrative. For example, the case worker may double-check
whether the unemployed individual has made the applications that she states to
have made in the submitted monthly overviewof job search activities. How ever,
monitoring also often involves regular meetings at the UI agency or the employ-
ment oﬃce, at which recent search activities are evaluated and a plan for the next
period is made. This may even include a directive to accept a particular open
vacancy. Usually the agencies only consider samples of cases. If the individual
is detected not to comply with the guidelines then she may be punished with
a sanction in the form of a beneﬁts reduction which is often combined with an
increased monitoring rate and the threat of a more severe punishment in case
of repeat oﬀense. A typical unemployment-beneﬁts reduction amounts to 15% of
the beneﬁts level for a period of 2 months.
7See Biewen et al. (2006), Cr´ epon, Dejemeppe and Gurgand (2005), Foug` ere, Pradel and
Roger (2005), Hujer, Thomsen and Zeiss (2006), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2000), and
Weber and Hofer (2004). The only study reporting signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects, and this for
both genders, is Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002).
8Compare Biewen et al. (2006), Cr´ epon, Dejemeppe and Gurgand (2005), Foug` ere, Pradel
and Roger (2005), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2000), and Weber and Hofer (2004). These
5 studies concern Austria in 2000, France in the mid 1990s and beginning 2000s, Western
Germany in the mid 2000s and Switzerland in the mid 1990s (see Table 1 and Table 2).
9Cr´ epon, Dejemeppe and Gurgand (2005), Hujer, Thomson and Zeiss (2006), and Gerﬁn
and Lechner (2002).
10Eastern Germany, in Biewen et al. (2006).
11All studies discussed in this subsection concern economies with a relatively low
female labor force participation. Four studies estimate gender-speciﬁc monitoring
eﬀects.11 Their primary outcome measure is the exit rate out of unemployment.
One of these studies ﬁnds signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of monitoring on the exit
rate out of unemployment for both genders. One study ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect for men but an insigniﬁcant positive eﬀect for women, and one ﬁnds a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect for women but an insigniﬁcant positive eﬀect for men.
The fourth study does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for either gender, but its sample
size is small. The studies also examine the destination state following exit out
of unemployment, i.e. they consider exit to work and exit to non-participation
as possible outcomes. The two studies that found signiﬁcant eﬀects on the total
exit rate also showthat the positive eﬀect on exit to w ork is larger for men than
for women, whereas the positive eﬀect on exit to non-participation is larger for
women that for men. This conﬁrms the hypothesis formulated in Section 2. In
the two other studies, exits to non-participation are virtually absent under any
monotoring regime considered.
We nowturn to studies on the eﬀects of imposition of a sanction. Tw o studies
estimate gender-speciﬁc sanction eﬀects.12 Both take the transition rate from un-
employment to employment as the outcome measure (exits to other destinations
are virtually absent in their data). They ﬁnd that upon imposition of a sanction,
the transition rate jumps to a signiﬁcantly higher level, for men as well as women.
One study ﬁnds larger eﬀect for women, whereas the other ﬁnds similar eﬀects
for men as for single mothers. The order of magnitude of the eﬀect is often such
that the transition rate doubles. Such eﬀects are substantial, and they indicate
that the individuals are responsive to monetary incentives. To put this diﬀerently,
the re-employment rate can be increased among individuals who are at risk of a
sanction if one tightens the monitoring or the search eﬀort conditions for beneﬁts
entitlement. The eﬀect does not vanish after beneﬁts are restored to their previ-
ous level, so presumably the threat of severe additional sanctions plays a major
role in the magnitude of the eﬀect. Indeed, recidivism seems to be rare.
11Dolton and O’Neill (2002), Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006), Micklewright and
Nagy (2005), and McVicar (2006).
12Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2004) and Abbring, Van den Berg and Van
Ours (2005).
123.4 Employment subsidies
Employment subsidies arguably constitute the most heterogeneous group of poli-
cies. They encompass (i) direct job creation schemes in the public and non-proﬁt
sectors, (ii) hiring subsidies for private-sector employers if they hire an unem-
ployed worker, and (iii) start-up grants for unemployed individuals who set up
their own business. Typically these measures are temporary, in contrast to em-
ployment tax credits for which in general no time limits are imposed (for a com-
parison, see for example Blundell and Meghir, 2001). Job creation schemes and
hiring subsidies are not necessarily expected to lead to a permanent job with the
same employer. The studies we survey mostly focus on the employment proba-
bility and the transition rate out of unemployment for women as outcomes of
interest.
We ﬁrst summarize the results from the four studies estimating gender-speciﬁc
eﬀects of hiring subsidies for private-sector employers.13 All of the four studies
ﬁnd positive eﬀects for women. The data are all from economies with a rela-
tively lowfemale labor force participation. The estimated eﬀects for men never
exceed those for women. However, in two of the four cases the estimated eﬀect
for men is similarly positive. In the two other cases, the estimates for men show
a signiﬁcantly negative impact on their employment chances.
One study considers start-up grants.14 This study, with data from Western
Germany, ﬁnds that grants with a length of 0.5 to 3 years increase the employment
probability for men and women. The eﬀect for women is larger.
Finally, we turn to job creation schemes. Let us ﬁrst review the results for
economies with a relatively low female labor force participation. Six studies satisfy
this condition.15 The results are mixed, and this perhaps reﬂects the huge amount
of heterogeneity of the various job creation programs in terms of the types of jobs
created and the guidance. The estimates range from signiﬁcantly positive with
respect to the exit rate to work to signiﬁcantly negative with respect to the
13Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002), Gerﬁn, Lechner and Steiger (2005), Kluve, Lehmann and
Schmidt (1999), and Zhang (2003). Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2000) and Bolvig, Jensen
and Rosholm (2003) do not distinguish between job creation schemes and hiring subsidies. The
latter two studies ﬁnd a positive eﬀect for women and a smaller positive eﬀect for men.
14Baumgartner and Caliendo 2006.
15Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002), Gerﬁn, Lechner and Steiger (2005), Hujer, Caliendo and
Thompsen (2004, 2006), Van Ours (2004), and Zhang (2003). See also footnote 13 concern-
ing Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2000).
13employment probability. There is also no clear pattern in the gender diﬀerence:
it can be positive, zero, or negative.
Four studies estimate individual employment eﬀects of job creation schemes
in Eastern Germany.16 These four, together with the one study with Danish data
that merges job creation schemes and hiring subsidies,17 represent the only studies
of employment subsidy policies in economies with a relatively high labor force
participation. All ﬁve reach the conclusion that the eﬀects are more favorable
for women than for men. The estimated eﬀects for women range from a strong
reduction in the unemployment probability to a slight increase in the conditional
probability of exiting nonemployment. However, at least part of the reduction in
the unemployment probability in Eastern Germany is due to women leaving the
labor force. The estimated eﬀects for men do not all have the same sign.
The results for hiring subsidies and start-up subsidies are in line with the
results in the rest of the paper. The ﬁndings for job creation are somewhat out
of line with these. Job creation programs seem to perform uniformly well for
women in economies with a high labor force participation, in the sense that they
leave unemployment faster, and that they beneﬁt more from the program than
men. There are some possible explanations. First, participation in a job creation
programs may help to overcome statistical discrimination by employers against
individual women. Observation of the woman’s performance in a created job may
provide an opportunity for employers to learn the individual productivity of a
woman. This may be particularly relevant in an economy with a high female labor
force participation, because employers may then feel that unemployed women in
particular constitute a pool of “bad draws” from the productivity distribution.
Secondly, all studies on which this result is based except one concern Eastern
Germany, so the result may be a speciﬁcity of the Eastern German situation.
Indeed, women in East Germany seem to move relatively often to labor-market-
non-participation after participation in a job creation program.
4 Conclusions
The results in the empirical literature are remarkably uniform. In general, active
labor market policies have a positive eﬀect on employment outcomes for women.
16Bergemann (2005), Eichler and Lechner (2002), and Hujer, Caliendo and Thompsen (2004,
2006).
17Bolvig, Jensen and Rosholm (2003).
14Moreover, the eﬀects are larger than for men, in particular in economies with a
relatively lowfemale labor force participation. These conclusions are strongest
for skill-training programs. Thus, positive and larger eﬀects of training on em-
ployment outcomes for women compared to men go along with a larger gender
gap in labor force participation. This is in agreement to the economic line of
reasoning in Section 2, which emphasizes the importance of a shift away from
home production in response to productivity increases due to training. For job
search assistance programs, hiring subsidies, and start-up grants, the conclusions
are similar. With female labor force participation increasing in a given economy
over time, one may expect the eﬀectiveness of these active labor market policies
to decrease for women, into the direction of the more limited eﬀectiveness for
men. For men, job search assistance programs seem to be more eﬀective than
skill-training programs.
Monitoring also aﬀects women’s exit rate out of unemployment. The size of
the eﬀect is on average more or less equal to that for men, but the exit desti-
nation is more often non-participation for women and employment for men. Job
creation program participation also sometimes leads to a higher exit into non-
participation for women. In the light of the general ﬁndings for other programs,
job creation programs perform remarkably well for women in economies with a
high labor force participation, in the sense that they leave unemployment faster
and that they beneﬁt more from the program than men. We conjecture that this
is because participation in job creation programs may help to overcome statistical
discrimination by employers against individual women.
We ﬁnish by pointing out a direction for further research. Evaluation stud-
ies are often unable to address over-all welfare eﬀects of program participation.
For example, monitoring presumably leads to a lower average productivity of
accepted jobs; employment subsidies in the private sector may crowd out other
potential workers; and training programs have lock-in eﬀects that may be hard
to quantify. Such eﬀects mitigate any positive treatment eﬀects. In general, total
program participation costs are diﬃcult to observe as well. These diﬃculties are
of course not restricted to evaluation studies by gender. In general, comprehensive
register data on wages, hours, job application procedures, and the functioning of
employment oﬃces, may help to overcome some of these problems. What adds to
the evaluation problems for women is that the line between being registered as
unemployment and being non-participant in the labor market is often thin. This
implies that potential program participants may be untraceable in data sets of la-
15bor market participants. Moreover, policy eﬀects may have an eﬀect of household
members’ labor market outcomes. It seems useful to therefore link the evaluation
data to registers on family members’ outcomes.
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